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The internal administration of American prisons has often been
shrouded from public view.1 In part, such invisibility has resulted from
prison rules which limit communication between prisoners and those
on the "outside." 2 Suits alleging that such rules violate freedom of
expression have enjoyed increasing success as courts have extended at
least partial coverage of the First Amendment to prisoners. 3 Three re-
cent federal decisions have gone a step farther and held that rules that
interfere with communication between prisoners and reporters may
violate not only the prisoners' First Amendment rights but those of
reporters and the public as well.4 The full impact of this new line of
cases must be assessed, however, in light of the Supreme Court's sub-
sequent denial of testimonial immunity to reporters in Branzburg v.
Hayes5 and its effective evisceration of any First Amendment "public
right to hear" in Kleindienst v. Mandel.0 Although Branzburg and
1. NEv Yoan STATE SPECIAL COMTISSION ON ArTcA, OFFICIAL REPoRT xii (1971). The
Attica Commission concluded that, "The worrisome reality is that prisons, prisoners, and
problems of both are essentially invisible in the United States. We Americans have made
our prisons disappear from sight as if by act of will." Id.
2. Another factor which limits communication is that American prisons are often
located in remote rural areas. For example, the Attica Commission found that the geo-
graphic isolation of Attica rendered the right of prisoners to receive visitors "illusoa"
since many of the inmates' families and friends could not afford transportation to
prison or lodging after they arrived. NEw YoRK STATE SPECIAL COs.sstsiSz. O% A-rscA,
supra note 1, at 61.
3. Lower courts have found that a number of First Amendment rights, including
those of expression, survive incarceration. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178.
202-03 (2d Cir. 1971) (right to possess one's own writings), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1971) (right to receive religious
literature); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1969) (right to receive re-
ligious literature and correspond with religious leaders); Jackson v. Godwin. 400 F.2d 529.
540-42 (5th Cir. 1968) (right to receive Black publications); Payne v. Whitmore. 325
F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (right to receive newspapers and magazines); Fortune
Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (right to receive a newsletter
published by former inmates and often critical of prison authorities); Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970) (right to send uncensored, uninspectced
mail); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (right to send
ones family a letter critical of prison officials). But see Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d
757 (5th Cir. 1966) (blanket ban on letters sent by death-row inmate is reasonable); Lee
v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (prison restrictions on extent and character of
prisoner correspondence do not infringe First Amendment). See also Note, Prison Mail
Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87 (1971); Note, The Right of
Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 407 (1967); 18 CATAIOmC U. L. REv. 237 (1968).
For recent cases vindicating prisoner expression rights, see note 16 infra.
4. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Washington Post Co. v. Klein-
dienst, Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972), 1 Puso. L. PRi. 141 (1972) (For a de-
tailed history of this decision, see note 24 infra); Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp.
880 (W..N.Y. 1972).
5. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
6. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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Mandel do not undermine the holdings of the three prison decisions,
their doctrinal overtones cast serious doubt on the existence of any spe-
cial First Amendment privilege for reporters seeking access to prisoners.
I. Breaches in the Wall of Silence: Recent Decisions
on Press Access to Prisoners
Typical prison rules and procedures limiting communication be-
tween inmates and persons outside the prison include restrictions on
the type of manuscripts prisoners may publish,7 bans on letters to all but
approved correspondents, 8 mail censorship, limitations on the number
and type of visitors a prisoner may have,'0 and bans on prisoner inter-
7. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 7300.7A, In-
mate Manuscripts, July 7, 1971, which provides that an inmate manuscript
shall not be approved for publication if it deals with the life or criminal career
of the writer or any other person, matters presently in litigation, or it the publi-
cation contains statements that are likely to have a detrimental effect on security
or discipline.
8. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 7300.1A, Cor-
respondence Regulations 2, March 16, 1972. Prior approval of correspondents is gen-
erally not required under these regulations. However, an inmate may be placed on 're
stricted correspondence" status if he mails an excessive number of letters, regularly at.
tempts to correspond with persons unknown to him except through ads in newspapers
and magazines, id. at 1, or mails letters which are frequently rejected for any of
several'reasons, including the fact that they contain discussions of criminal activities,
Id. at 4. Administrative approval of correspondents is required for inmates on restricted
status. Id. at 2. Other permissible reasons for requiring prior approval include Inmates'
status as "major security risks, major participants in organized criminal activities . . .
[or] notorious or highly publicized offenders." Id. at 2. The Danbury, Conn., Federal
Correctional Institution, Policy Statement CT-7300.15, March 24, 1972, which imple-
ments the Federal Policy Statement on inmate correspondence, provides that an inmate
may be placed on restricted correspondence status if his letters "jeopardize community
relations." Id. at 2.
9. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 7300.IA, Cor-
iespondence Regulations 4, March 16, 1972. That Statement provides that inmate letters
Will not be forwarded if they contain (1) material which might violate postal regulations,
such as threats or blackmail, (2) discussions of criminal activities, (3) instructions for
the operation of the inmate's former business, (4) code messages, or (5) language other
than English. The fifth condition is not, however, a complete ban on non-English letters
since efforts are made to accommodate inmates who are unable to write in English. Id.
The Danbury, Conn., Federal Correctional Institution, Policy Statement CT-7300.15,
March 24, 1972, supra note 8, also proscribes inmate letters which solicit "catalogues,
unauthorized educational material, price lists, unauthorized newspapers, printed ma.
terial, free samples, etc." Id. at 6.
10. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 7300AA,
Visiting Regulations, April 24, 1972, which provides that each inmate shall submit a
list of persons with whom he wishes to visit. Id. at 6. Proposed visitors will then be in-
vestigated for clearance by prison officials. Members of an inmate's immediate family
will be approved as visitors "under ordinary circumstances." Id. at 3. Other relatives
may be placed on the list. Friends may be approved as visitors "if it can be ascertained
that the association or friendship is a genuinely constructive one and that the offender
would profit from such continued contact." Id. After approval of the visitor list, re-
strictions may be placed on the number who may visit at any one time and the fre-
quency of visits. Id. at 2, 3. Danbury, Conn., Federal Correctional Institution, Policy
Statement CT-7300.18, May 26, 1972, implementing this visitation policy, provides that
"each inmate will be allotted seven visits per calendar month" and that "the number
of persons visiting one inmate as a group shall be limited to three." Id. at 5.
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views by reporters."' Despite the fact that they clearly restrict prisoner
expression, such rules have been upheld as a proper exercise of adminis-
trative discretion to achieve prison security and other objectives of in-
carceration. 12 The assumption that prisoners forfeited most expression
rights eliminated the othenvise obvious requirement that such rules
meet First Amendment standards. 13 This assumption, however, was
seriously undermined by the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Cooper
v. Pate'4 that prison restrictions on religious practices were subject to
the First Amendment.' 5 Subsequent decisions in lower courts have
enlarged the scope of protected prisoner rights,' 0 but no court has yet
11. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 1220.1A,
Inmate Correspondence with Representatives of the Press and News Media, Feb. I!,
1972, which states that "press representatives will not be pcrmitted to interview indi-
vidual inmates." This interview ban was struck down in The Washington Post Co. v.
Kleindienst, Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972), 1 PRisox L. Rter. 141 (1972). For a
detailed history of this decision, see note 24 infra.
Rather than banning interviews completely, other prison rules may allow them only
at the discretion of the prison administrator. In Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880
(W.D.N.Y. 1972), the court voided a New York rule which allowed prison officials to
deny interviews which would "adversely affect the integrity, security and safety of cor-
rectional programs and facilities, and inmates or parolees thereof." But see Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Daggett, Civil No. 9557 (W.D. Wash., May 6, 1972), 1
PRISON L. Rpm'. 229 (1972) (upholding an interview restriction at a federal institution).
The National Council on Crime and Delinquenc), in a proposed model act to protect
prisoners' rights, would permit interviewing of prisoners by reporters. 18 CSUmE & DE-
LINQUENCY 13 (1972). See also NEw YORK STArE Szrc.Lu. Co.mbussiox o. Am-re, supra
note 1, at 63.
12. See, e.g., Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F. Supp. 46, 50-51 (D. Conn. 1971), afl'd, 451
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. Without such conceptual underpinning, this "hands off" doctrine would be con-
trary to a celebrated line of cases in other contexts vindicating First Amendment rights
infringed by administrative rules or actions. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxlcy, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). The doctrine has
been frequently criticized. See, e.g., Goldfarb and Singer, Redressing Prisoners Griev-
ances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights,
5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTrs-CW. LIB. L. REv. 227 (1970); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Lau,
in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 SrAx. L. Rv. 473 (1971);
Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoner Rights, 53 1oWA L
REv. 671 (1967); Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, supra note 3; Note, Con-
stitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1952);
Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L.
REv. 841 (1971); Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, supra note 3;
Note, Constitutional Limitations of the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YAIE U.J.
941 (1970); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Re-
view the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
14. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
15. Id. The decision held that an allegation that prison administrators were inter-
ferring with the religious activities of Black Muslim prisoners in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1958).
16. For a general list of successful post-Cooper expression cases, see note 3 supra.
The fate of the most recent cases involving prisoner allegations of First Amendment
violations has been mixed, reflecting continuing judicial uncertainty as to the rights of
prisoners. See, e.g., Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 1972) (allegation that
unlawful mail censorship violates prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
must be heard on the merits); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 275-77 (D. Md.
1972) (prison authorities cannot exercise absolute discretion in inspecting, censoring,
and refusing to deliver inmate mail, but the court cannot say that any particular type
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enunciated a general First Amendment standard for prisoner expres-
sion.1
7
In the three recent cases, continuing judicial reluctance to apply full
First Amendment protection to prisoner expression has led to the ex-
ploration of novel doctrinal terrain. Restrictions on inmate communi-
cation were there invalidated because they abridged a combination of
the rights of inmates and those outside the prison with whom or by
whom communication was sought.' In Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, the First
Circuit explicitly declined to hold that prisoners retain the First
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens.' 9 Nevertheless, Judge Coffin
struck down a flat ban on prisoner correspondence with newsmen "pri-
marily" because "the condition of our prisons is an important matter
of public policy." 20 The public policy relevance of prisoner correspond-
ence was found to implicate the "right of the public to hear" which in
turn "enhanced" expression rights of the prisoners.2' Because this duo
of rights was entitled to traditional First Amendment protection, the
court required the use of less drastic means22 to further the asserted
of mail censorship is completely proscribed by the Constitution). But see In re Hounshell,
No. 7798 (San Luis Obispo County, Calif. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 1972), 1 PRISON L. Rirn.
294 (1972) (inmates may be limited in the number of hard-cover books they can keep
in their cell); Freeley v. Henderson, No. 16580 (N.D. Ga., June 29, 1972), 1 l'RsoN L.
Rpm. 270 (1972) (while the First Amendment prohibits a blanket denial of federal
prisoner's request to prepare memoirs, diaries, or manuscripts, the prisoner may not
publish such material if publication, in the warden's view, would lead to prison dis-
ruptions) (dictum).
17. For the form such a doctrine might assume, see p. 1353 infra.
18. Before the three decisions, courts had generally ignored the effect of rules re-
stricting prisoner communication on "listeners" rights. See, e.g., McDonough v. Di-
rector of Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970). In McDonough, the Fourth Circuit
decided that while an inmate had a right to correspond with Playboy for the pur-
pose of obtaining assistance for a defective delinquency redetermination hearing, prison
officials could suppress prisoner correspondence whose "purpose .. .was to effect pub-
lication of a critique of the defective delinquency law and its implementation .... "
Id. at 1193. The court did not consider the potential value of such a critique to the
readers of Playboy. See also Maas v. United States, 371 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (prisoner's
manuscript dealing with organized crime, originally written at government request,
confiscated on the ground that publication would be detrimental to law enforcement).
19. 451 F.2d 545, 547 (1st Cir. 1971).
20. Id. The court held that the prisoners could trafnsmit to the press any letters
concerning prison management, treatment of offenders, or personal grievances except
those which "(a) contain or concern contraband or (b) contain or concern any plan of
escape or device for evading prison regulations." Id. at 551. Judge Coffin noted at the
beginning of the opinion that the prisoner-plaintiffs had not asserted a "right to cor-
respond with the news media about matters of public policy or personal affairs unre-
lated to the prisons." Id. at 546. This suggests that correspondence with newsmen not
related to prison affairs could still be restricted. See also Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F.
Supp. 1119, 1122 (D.N.H. 1971) (Nolan does not extend protection to communication
concerning matters unrelated to the prison) (dictum). The authority to determine, in
close cases, what did or did not relate to the prison would presumably rest with ad-
ministrators. The validity of such a subject-matter based distinction has since become
suspect. See pp. 1349-50 infra.
21. 451 F.2d at 548.
22. Id. at 548, 551. For discussion of the less drastic means test, see United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
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state interests in prison security and discipline.23
In Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst,24 the fact that non-inmate
interests were at issue was even more obvious than in Nolan, since an
absolute ban on interviews was challenged not by the prisoners, but by
the newspaper which had been denied interviewing privileges.2 3 In
this context, the court noted no fewer than three interests affected by
the interview ban:
As this inquiry is pursued there is no need to differentiate be-
tween the rights of the press and the rights of prisoners.... News
gathering and news dissemination cannot be disassociated under
circumstances such as these where it is assumed there is a mutual
desire to communicate and where, in the last analysis, the public
right to be informed may well overshadow either of the other two
considerations. "
This amalgam of interests, the court believed, was deserving of full
First Amendment protection.27 Finding that less drastic means could
be employed to further the state interests of prison security and disci-
pline, the court invalidated the interview ban.
2 8
The same amalgam was invoked in Burnham v. Oswald 2 against a
rule forbidding press interviews with inmates where such interviews
would adversely affect the "integrity" of the institution.30 Beginning
with the proposition that "the right of an inmate to send letters to the
press survives incarceration," the court reasoned that inmates must also
23. 451 F.2d at 548-49.
24. Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972), 1 PRso. L. Rrm. 141 (1972). After the
Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes, 403 U.S. 665 (1972), it stayed the Wash-
ington Post decision, 406 U.S. 912 (1972). pending appeal. In its appeal of Washington
Post, the Government argued that Branzburg constituted a significant limitation on the
protection afforded news gathering activities and obtained a remand of Washington Post
for reconsideration in the light of Branzburg. Civil No. 72-1362 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6.
1972), 1 PPSON L. Rprm. 337 (1972). On remand, the district court reaffirmed its original
decision. Civil No. 467-72 D.D.C., Dec. 19, 1972). See pp. 1352-53 infra. The Bureau of
Prisons has appealed the second district court decision.
25. Ben Bagdikian, a Washington Post reporter, had unsuccessfully sought access to
prisoners who had agreed to be interviewed at two federal institutions. Lewisburg and
Danbury. He was denied permission by Norman Carlson, Director of the United States
Bureau of Prisons, who relied on a Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement of Feb. 11,
1972, prohibiting all interviews of federal prisoners by newsmen. Sec note 11 supra.
26. Civil Action No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972) at 6, 1 Piuso. L Rm at 142.
27. Id. at 8-9, 1 PRISON L. Rvni. at 143.
28. Id. For two prior cases rejecting the contention that restrictions on press inter-
views infringed prisoners' First Amendment rights, see Scale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp.
1375 (D. Conn. 1971) (rule requiring administrative approval of prisoner's request for
press interview is reasonable and does not violate the First Amendment) and Smith v.
Bounds (E.D.N.C., Mar. 10, 1972), 1 PRISON L. Rem. 144 (1972) (interview ban held
within discretion of prison officials since prisoners had sufficient opportunity for contact
with newsmen by means of correspondence). Seale and Smith differ from Washington
Post in that they involved only allegations of infringement of inmates rights.
29. 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
30. Id. at 887.
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have the right to have newsmen visitors under reasonable circumstances,
apparently on the grounds that no compelling reason had been sug-
gested for differentiating between the two forms of communication."
This conclusion, the court argued, was "buttressed by a consideration
of the rights of the newsmen . .. to gather information and to have
access to news sources" as well as by the public's right to hear and be
informed.32 Thus, having found a combination of interests worthy of
First Amendment status, the court invalidated the prison's interview
rules.3
3
At first impression Nolan, Washington Post, and Burham all appear
to fall squarely within the post-Cooper line of cases adding rights of
access to newsmen as another step toward general First Amendment
protection for prisoners. But, in fact, all three decisions declined to
rest their holdings solely on prisoners' rights.3 4 Rather the protection
of communication between press and prisoners was based on an amal-
gam of the prisoner's right to communicate, the press' right to gather
news, and the public's right to know.35
For plaintiffs such a summing of rights may seem an attractive doc-
trine.36 Although post-Cooper courts have been increasingly willing to
vindicate prisoners' First Amendment claims, in each case there has
been a threshold question of whether the particular right asserted sur-
vived incarceration.3 7 But, once the rights of non-prisoners are in-
voked, the necessity for such an inquiry is largely obviated. A poten-
tial flaw in the amalgam doctrine, however, is that the interests it en-
compasses are perhaps less deserving of First Amendment protection
31. Id. at 885.
32. Id. at 885-86
33. Id. at 887.
34. See pp. 1340-41 supra.
35. All three decisions relied on either a "public right to hear" or "public right to
know." Washington Post and Burnham also relied on a distinct press right to gather
news. Nolan did not consider the press right. See 451 F.2d at 547 n.2.
36. The fate of subsequent cases utilizing similar theories has been mixed. See Mc.
Donnel v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 624 (D. Iowa 1972) (ban on prisoner letters to news
media whose violation is accompanied by severe punishment should be relaxed but it is
unnecessary to decide whether such a ban is unconstitutional) (dictum). But see Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Daggett, Civil No. 9557 (D. Wash., May 6, 1972), 1 PRISON
L. RTrt. 229 (1972) (court may not order officials at a federal penitentiary to lift re-
striction on press interviews of prisoners). For a case rejecting the notion that reporters
have a right to gather news, and yet allowing prisoner interviews solely on the basis
of the prisoner's right of expression, see Hillery v. Procunier, Civil No. C071-2150 SW
(N.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 1972). Hillery is of dubious precedential value because it only
reached the issue of prisoners' rights after mistakenly concluding that the Supreme Court
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), withdrew constitutional protection from
reporters' news-gathering activities. See p. 1346 infra.
37. A "balancing" approach has often been utilized by post-Cooper courts to deter-
mine which constitutional rights accompany a prisoner into incarceration. See, e.
Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529
(5th Cir. 1969); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970).
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than was originally supposed. All three courts recognized the uncer-
tain status of prisoner First Amendment claims and sought to avoid
exclusive reliance on them. But they then relied on other rights, those
of the press and public, whose status was equally uncertain.
At the time Nolan, Washington Post, and Burham were decided,
for example, lower courts were in disagreement as to whether the right
to gather news even existed.38 Although the Supreme Court had not
considered the issue directly, in Zemel v. Rush30 it did reject a claim
that a ban on travel to Cuba violated the First Amendment right of an
individual to acquire information. While that case involved individual
information-gathering rather than an access claim by the press, Zemel
holds at a minimum that not all attempts to acquire information are
constitutionally protected.4 0
Unlike the right of the press to gather news, the public right to know
had enjoyed affirmative recognition from the Supreme Court. In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,4 1 the Court upheld the FCC's "fairness
doctrine" as furthering "the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas."42 In that
context, the public right to know was an allocative concept requiring
broadcasters to offer opportunities for a diversity of viewpoints. 43 But
it is not immediately clear that the Red Lion right to know is the same
right which figured in the prison cases. The uncertainty results from
the fact that the term "public right to know" is subject to at least three
different interpretations.
First, in perhaps its most popular sense, the public right to know may
mean an affirmative government obligation to disclose information.
44
This version of the right, which may be termed the government dis-
closure duty, is akin to the concept embodied in the Freedom of Infor-
38. Compare Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). rev'd, 408 U.S.
665 (1972), and Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), with Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 88485 (3d Cir. 1958). See Note, The
Right of the Press to Gather News, 71 CoLu.t. L. REv. 838, 848 (1971).
39. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
40. The Court admitted that though the travel ban rendered "less than wholly free
the flow of information concerning [Cubal," id. at 16. it was not unconstitutional be-
cause "the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information." Id. at 17. While it has been suggested that the outcome of the
case might have been different if the unsuccessful traveler had been a journalist rather
than a private citizen, Note, The Right of the Press to Gather News, supra note 38.
at 846, Zemel offers little support for a reporter's constitutional right of access to news
sources.
41. 395 U.S. 567 (1969).
42. Id. at 390.
43. See id. at 380-90. See generally T. EmERsoq, TtE SYsr.. or FREaOs OF oo E-xvSSao.
656-67 (1970).
44. See generally H. L. CRoss, Tin PEoPLE's Ricirr "ro KNow (1953); T. EM.n,
THE SYsTEm OF FxrUOM OF Exarussmo%, supra note 43, at 672.
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mation Acti which provides every citizen with access to unclassified
government information. But in the absence of such a statutorily-cre-
ated disclosure duty, no court has ever suggested that the First Amend-
ment alone mandates the release of such information. In the three
prison cases, there was no intent to invoke a government disclosure
duty, although loose language in a subsequent Washington Post de-
cision may come close.
46
The second possible interpretation of the public right to know is that
contained in Red Lion. In that case, the Court recognized that state-
sanctioned monopolies of radio and television frequencies inevitably
restricted programming received by the public to that reflecting broad-
casters' preferences.47 Because such a limitation on diversity resulted
in part from government intervention, the Court viewed favorably a
requirement that broadcasters allow equal broadcast time to speakers
representing opposing points of view. 48 But since air-time is limited,
not all speakers or views could be accommodated. The "fairness doc-
trine" upheld by Red Lion thus obliges broadcasters to present only
the views of responsible spokesmen on controversial issues, 40 on the
theory that these would best serve the public's interest in receiving
diverse facts and opinions. This version, which may be termed the
public right to hear, thus protects only a limited category of speech
which meets administrative or judicial standards of relevance. Because
each of the three prison cases invoked the public right to know after
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
46. The [United States] Bureau of Prisons . . . has an obligation to lay open its
activities to searching public scrutiny except to the extent that it can affirmatively
establish a compelling necessity to limit press access. There is an important and
continuing discourse about our prisons, and the "right to receive information"
necessary to convey developments to the public is within the scope of protections
afforded by the First Amendment.
Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Dec. 19, 1972) at 3 (citation omitted). This language seems
to imply that prison officials themselves have a duty to disclose news about internal
prison affairs. But closer attention reveals that the court was not requiring the Bureau
of Prisons to make public its official data but only removing a government-imposed
restriction on communication between willing inmate-speakers and reporters.
47. 395 U.S. at 388-89, 392.
48. Id. at 390-91.
49. 395 U.S. at 385. Although Red Lion did not explicitly state that only "responsible"
spokesmen were to be favored by application of the "fairness doctrine," the rule upheld
by the decision was so limited. See, e.g., Note, Ofensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J.
1343, 1348 (1970). The requirement that the view be on a "controversial" issue clearly
imposes a content-based restriction on the scope of the public right to hear doctrine.
This resriction raises the difficult question of what constitutes a "controversial" issue.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (commercials for
high-powered cars and high-octane gasoline trigger the fairness doctrine); Green v. FCC,
447 F.2d 323, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (military recruitment commercials do not trigger the
"fairness doctrine" since "the undesirable features of military life have been displayed
in virtually every living room, frequently in living (or dying) color"); WCBS.rv, 8
F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), a!f'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("fairness doctrine" held applicable to cigarette commercials).
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finding that prison affairs were vital matters of public policy,50 those
decisions may be viewed as embracing this second version.
The third possible interpretation of the public right to know equates
it with the private, personal right of all citizens to receive information
directed to them. This concept, usually associated with Lamont v. Post-
master General,al is designed to assure that citizens may hear speech
addressed to them even though the speaker, through some quirk of
status, may not himself be protected by the First Amendment.52 This
right to receive information as upheld in Lamont resembles tie public
right to hear of Red Lion in its protection of communication between
willing speakers and listeners, but differs in that it protects all speech,
regardless of value or relevance. None of the prison cases, however,
seems to involve this version, since, as previously suggested, each ap-
pears to invoke a right to hear stemming from the public policy con-
tent of prisoner-press communications.5
4
By eschewing Lamont's more prosaic version of the right to receive
information in favor of Red Lion's content-oriented public right to
hear, the three prison cases created an immediate doctrinal problem:
No court had ever applied the Red Lion doctrine outside the broadcast
context. Indeed, judicial recognition of content-related distinctions be-
tween different categories of speech had been explicitly rejected in a
number of cases.5 Thus, as with the press right to gather news, the
public right to know component of Washington Post, Nolan, and Bur-
ham was equally without direct precedent.
Such doubts have been amplified by two subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. Branzburg v. Hayes"0 further undercuts the already uncertain
notion that the First Amendment confers a special right of the press to
gather news, and Kleindienst v. Mandela7 calls into question the under-
50. Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972) at 4, 1 Passo4 L. Rrm. 141 (1972); 342
F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1971); 451 F.2d 545, 547 (1st Cir. 1971).
51. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
52. In Lamont, the rights of American addressees of communist propaganda mailed
from abroad were entitled to constitutional protection, even though the alien writers
themselves might have been excluded from First Amendment coverage. Id. at 807-08.
53. Lamont did not explicitly state that it protects receipt of all speech regardless
of social worth, but such a holding is implied in its rejection of the authority of ad-
ministrators to "appraise" the mailed material. 381 US. at 206. A lacer cae, Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), explicitly declares that the individual right to receive
information does not involve any evaluation of the "social worth" of the material to
be received. Id. at 564. But see Note, Still More Ado About Dirty Boohs (and Pictures):
Stanley, Reidel and Thirty-seven Photographs, 81 YALE L.J. 309 (1971).
54. See p. 1344 supra.
55. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269.70 (1964); Kingsley Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
56. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
57. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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lying validity of the public right to hear, at least in non-broadcast
contexts.
II. The Right to Gather News After Branzburg
Branzburg did not involve news-gathering in the prison context but
rather the claim that the First Amendment afforded newsmen a privi-
lege to withhold the content of confidential interviews from state and
federal grand juries.58 Though conceding that requiring such testimony
would impede news-gathering 9 by inhibiting confidential sources,60
the Court nevertheless rejected the privilege claim, holding that the
"public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand
jury proceedings" was sufficient to "override the consequential, but un-
certain, burden on news gathering."' Central to this holding was the
finding that the newsmen had failed to demonstrate that the testimony
would result in "a significant constriction of the flow of the news to
the public.
' -0 2
But this denial of privilege was not predicated on the absence of a
right to gather news; indeed, its existence was specifically acknowl-
edged. 3 What the Court did deny was that requiring reporters to
testify would normally result in an impermissible inhibition or chilling
of the exercise of that right with a consequential diminution in news
flow.64 It is odd, however, that the plurality could so firmly reject the
58. 408 US. at 690. Branzburg was a consolidation of four state and federal court
cases. The first two were Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), and Branzburg
v. Meigs, an unreported decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. They involved con-
tentions by Branzburg, a reporter for the Louisville Courier-journal, that he was privi-
leged to withhold from state grand juries information acquired from confidential
sources about manufacture, sale, and use of hashish and marijuana. 408 U.S. at 607-71.
The third, In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), involved a state court
effort by Pappas, a reporter for a New Bedford, Mass., television station, to withhold
confidential information acquired during a three-hour stay inside the New Bedford
headquarters of the Black Panther Party. 408 U.S. at 672-75. The fourth, United States
v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), arose from the efforts of Caldwell, a New
York Times reporter, to withhold confidential information about the aims, purposes, and
activities of the Black Panther Party from a federal grand jury. 408 U.S. at 675-79. State
courts had rejected the claims of Branzburg, id. at 669-71, and Pappas, id. at 673.75,
but the Ninth Circuit had held that the First Amendment afforded Caldwell a privi-
lege not only to withhold testimony absent a compelling state interest but also to refuse
grand jury attendance in the absence of any special necessity. Id. at 679. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decisions in Branzburg and Pappas and reversed in Caldwell, Id. at
708-09.
59. Id. at 690.
60. Id. at 693.
61. Id. at 690.
62. Id. at 693.
63. The Court emphasized that its decision should not be interpreted as implying
"that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
64. Id. at 681, 690-95. The standard of proof established by Branzburg may well In-
sure that the news-gathering right will rarely prevail over state practices which are
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claim that the news-gathering right had been inhibited without clearly
resolving the prior question of what that right was.
Branzburg's ambiguity results in part because what Justice White
terms the "right to gather news" is subject to two possible interpreta-
tions. In an extensive discussion of its scope, he describes it as a "funda-
mental personal right.., which is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals [but which] necessarily embraces . . . every sort of pub-
lication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."' ' 5 So
defined, the right protects reporters for unorthodox publications and
even individual pamphleteers to the same degree it protects accredited
representatives of the traditional news media. While not reading out
a requirement that the news-gathering right be connected with some
form of "press" activity, such a broad definition tends to trivialize the
requirement and transmute the press right into an individual right
nearly identical to Lamonl's right to receive information. G0 In essence,
alleged to indirectly inhibit its exercise since, as Justice Stewart's dissent notes, "[t]he
impairment of the flow of news cannot . . . be proved with scientific precision, as the
Court seems to demand." Id. at 733. The plurality's proof requirement seems to be
novel in the First Amendment area. Justice Steiart noted that prior cases had not re-
quired that inhibition or "chilling effect" be objectively demonstrated. Id. at 733-34.
Such a demonstration would obviously be rather difficult, as Justice Stewart's dissent
suggests. Would the plurality, for example, require evidence that the number of words
devoted to a category of news in a sampling of media had declined following the
initiation of a "chilling" practice by the government? The value, and even availabilit).
of such evidence seems doubtful. If it were a long-standing practice--e.g., requiring re-
porters to testify about confidential news sources before grand juries-a "control sample"
indicating the quantity of news in the absence of the practice might be unasailable.
Even if the practice had been recently initiated, the import of a showing of quantitative
diminishment in news flow would undoubtedly be ambiguous. Other factors-including
that always intangible concept, newsworthiness-might explain the decrease in coverage
of a particular subject.
65. Id. at 704, quoting from Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444. 450, 452 (1938).
66. See p. 1345 supra. On their face, the rights differ: The right to hear pro-
tects the simple receipt of information, while the right to gather news protects acqui-
sition of information with a view towards its dissemination. While the rights may indeed
be distinguishable in active/passive terms, further meaningful distinctions are nearly
impossible to make. Both rights protect communication between a willing speaker and
listener. See p. 1351 infra. Some indication that information which is sought will be
"disseminated" may be a prerequisite to protection under the news-gathering right.
but the requirement of such a showing is likely to be pro forina. Under Branzburg,
courts would apparently be forbidden to inquire into the genuineness of the news
dissemination purpose:
a [testimonial] privilege might be claimed by groups that set up newspapers in or-
der to engage in criminal activity and to therefore be insulated from grand jury
inquiry .. It might appear that such "sham" newspapers would be easily dis.
tinguishable, yet the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits courts from inquiring
into the content of expression . . . and protects speech and publications regardless
of their motivation, orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste . . .. By affording
a privilege to some organs of communication but not to others, courts would in-
evitably be discriminating on the basis of content.
Id. at 705 n.40. If courts may not distinguish between "sham" and genuine assertions
of the news-gathering right, then all that remains to separate it from the right to
receive information is its active character, and perhaps a vestigial formal requirement
that infringement of freedom of press be alleged. But see Note, Reporters and Their
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, &0 YA LJ. 317 (1970).
The right to gather news might also be asserted in an attempt to force the government
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this interpretation of Branzburg collapses freedom of the press into
freedom of speech with regard to the constitutional protection afforded
information acquisition.
A second construction of Branzburg's news-gathering right emerges
from another portion of the opinion where Justice White required
proof of the effects of inhibition by a showing "that there would be a
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public."' T By requir-
ing such proof, Branzburg here appears to transform the right to gather
news into a right which protects only activity demonstrably contribut-
ing to the aggregate amount of information reaching the public. It
would not protect news gathering which, in objective terms, would
contribute little or nothing to the general level of public information.
So defined, the right would primarily shield the news gathering of
traditional news organizations with large readerships since any inhi-
bition of their news gathering would have a much greater impact on
the flow of news than similar restrictions on pamphleteers or under-
ground newspapers.6 s
Under either interpretation, however, Branzburg's recognition of a
special reporter's right to gather news seems largely gratuitous. Under
the first interpretation, the right recognized is only an analogue of
the long-recognized First Amendment right of every individual to re-
ceive information and ideas. Under the second interpretation, a privi-
lege of somewhat greater content may exist, but it is limited primarily
to large news organizations. Moreover, by shifting focus from the rights
of individual reporters to the interest of the general public in receiving
an adequate flow of news, this latter version of the right to gather news
becomes a derivative right which can be asserted only when it furthers
the primary right of the public to hear.6 9 Yet even this second-class
status for the right to gather news is problematic in view of dicta in
to reveal information it preferred to withhold. Language in Branzburg indicates such
attempts would fail, since the press has no greater right to such information than do
ordinary citizens. Of course, if the government had a duty to disclose certain information
to ordinary citizens, then it would seem to have an equal duty to disclose it to news-
men. See 408 U.S. at 684-85. Private citizens would seem to be generally protected against
press efforts to force disclosure of information by elementary privacy considerations.
See Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972) at 3,
1 PRisoN L. Rem. 141 (1972).
67. 408 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
68. For a speculative discussion of the implications of Branzburg for news gathering
by the "underground press," see Comment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground
Press?, 8 HARV. Civ. RnsirS-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 181 (1973).
69. The interest of the public in receiving an adequate flow of news referred to in
Branzburg is conceptually equivalent to the public right to hear doctrine of Red Lion.
To maintain the distinctions developed among various interpretations of the "public
right to know," the term "public right to hear" has been substituted for Branzburg'a
terminology.
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Kleindienst v. Mandel,70 a companion case to Branzburg, which under-
mine the very foundations of the public right to hear doctrine.
III. The Public Right to Hear After Mandel
In Mandel the Court refused to overturn the denial of a visitor's visa
to a Belgian Marxist professor on the ground that Congress, and by
delegation, the Executive, possessed a plenary power to exclude aliens
without judicial review. 71 But having thus disposed of the immediate
problem before it, the Court then turned to what it apparently viewed
as a more interesting issue: plaintiff's assertion that such exclusion in-
fringed the rights of American academics to hear Mandel's speeches.
7 2
Treating that First Amendment claim as if on the merits, the majority
argued that if it were to balance the government's interest in excluding
aliens against the alleged public right to hear them, one of two results
would ensue. Either every claim for a visa would prevail, since every
excluded alien presumably has at least one potential listener, and the
exclusion law would be rendered a "nullity," or courts would be re-
quired to "weigh the strength of the audience's interest against that of
the government ... according to some as yet undetermined standard.
73
Such a balancing test would, however, entail the "obvious dangers" of
evaluating the audience's interests "on the basis of factors such as the
size of the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas."
74
This latter result was, in the Court's view, as "unsatisfactory" as the
former: 75 Regulation of communication between willing speakers and
listeners could not be based on content or audience status factors. Since
content-related factors such as relevance are critical to assertions of the
70. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
71. Id. at 765-67, 769-70.
72. Id. at 768-69.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 769. The Court has traditionally been loath to inquire into the content
of expression. See note 55 supra. It has shed its reluctance in the obscenity field, but it
did so there on the ground that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
The concept that First Amendment claims may not be ranked according to the number
of persons asserting protection is more novel, and on its face, potentially inequitable.
Refusal to "sum" the rights of hearers in effect reduces the "rights to hear" of a large
group of persons into a unitary right no more potent than the right of a single indi-
vidual asserting a potentially competing First Amendment claim. This result is super-
ficially at odds with the notion that the right to hear of each individual qua individual
is equal. The "no summing" rule may, however, gain tangential support from decisions
in the press context which have established that reporters representing media with large
readerships enjoy no greater protection of the free press clause than individuals who
disseminate news to much smaller audiences. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450, 452 (1938).
75. 408 U.S. at 768-69.
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public right to hear,"6 Mandel in effect, signals that this doctrine will
not be extended beyond the limited-channel broadcast context of Red
Lion.
Disapproval of the conceptual underpinning of the public right to
hear does not, of course, withdraw First Amendment protection from
listeners. Mandel explicitly reaffirms the third version of the public
right to know, the "right to receive information and ideas." 77 Under
that doctrine, every individual has a right to hear any speech directed
to him, even though the speaker may not enjoy First Amendment pro-
tection. Thus if a plenary power had not been at stake in Mandel,7 8
then limitations on the right to receive information resulting from en-
forcement of the alien exclusion law could have been imposed only
after the requisite "balancing" of classic First Amendment decisions,7 9
coupled with other considerations such as less drastic means.8 0 Mandel
merely rejects the proposition that the balance be struck more favorably
for more "valuable" speech or larger groups of listeners. Except for the
limited Red Lion exception, the public right to hear thus becomes no
greater than every individual's right to receive information.
IV. Nolan, Washington Post, and Burnham
After Branzburg and Mandel
Because the state interests at stake in inmate cases are so different
from those encountered in Branzburg and Mandel, the two decisions
are obviously not directly controlling in prison contexts.8 ' Yet on a
more abstract level, Branzburg and Mandel do concern communication
rights among prisoners, press, and public. Although they are not di-
rectly relevant insofar as they deal with the manner in which balances
76. See pp. 1344-45 supra.
77. 408 U.S. at 762-64.
78. The Court might have proceeded beyond the plenary power issue simply by
distinguisfiing prior alien exclusion cases on the grounds that none involved the rights
of American citizens. This approach, suggested by Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at 783,
would have made it necessary to balance government interests in exclusion against the
First Amendment right to hear.
79. If the government measure were characterized as a direct restriction on the en-
joyment of the First Amendment right, as Justice Marshall's dissent suggests, id. at 781,
then the government would have the burden of showing that the information flow
constituted incitement likely to lead to imminent lawless action. See, e.g., Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). Even if the restriction were characterized as fur-
thering a substantial interest unrelated to speech, the government would still have
the burden of showing that no less drastic means were available. See note 22 supra.
80. See note 22 supra.
81. The-increasing success of suits by prisoners alleging expression infringement in-
dicates that courts are by and large unwilling to accord the same deference to state
interests in effective prison administration as the Supreme Court did to grand jury
functioning in Branzburg and alien exclusion in Mandel. See cases cited in notes 3 & 16
supra.
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are to be struck against competing state interests, they do define the
status and scope of rights whici make up the First Amendment arm
of such balances.
On this level, the ultimate effect of Branzburg and Mandel is to
collapse the news-gathering right and the public right to know relied
on by the prison decisions into rights possessed by every individual re-
gardless of "press status" in its traditional sense. Branzburg's analysis
of the right to gather news is ambiguous: news acquisition may enjoy
protection not only under the rubric of the right of every citizen to
acquire information, but also derivatively, insofar as it furthers the
public's right to be informed. Yet Mandel suggests that any increment
to the individual news-gathering right from a public right to hear is
illusory since assertions of a right to hear do not gain additional pri-
ority according to the number of hearers or the value of the message.8 -
Thus a reporter's assertion of a public right to hear on behalf of his
readership can be no more than an assertion of his own right to receive
information. Similarly, claims of a news-gathering right are equivalent
to those of ordinary citizens engaged in any information-acquisition
for the purpose of further dissemination.
The two rights which emerge from Branzburg and Mandel are
nearly identical. The news-gathering right protects communication
initiated by persons seeking to receive information, while the right to
hear, in contrast, covers communication initiated by speakers. However,
in both instances, the rights function to protect a flow of information
from speakers to listeners. Since the rights are in reality merely active
and passive versions of the individual's right to receive communica-
tion, 3 they can scarcely "enhance" one another. Thus, in each of the
prison cases, only one right, in addition to the prisoners' rights of ex-
pression, was implicated: in Nolan and Burham, the right to hear, since
there prisoners sought communication;8 4 in Washington Post, the right
to gather news, since there reporters were the initiators.8
Restructuring the doctrinal foundation of the prison cases to con-
form with Branzburg and Mandel need not, however, vitiate their hold-
ings. Invoking the individual right to hear would have supported dis-
approval of the letter and interview bans in Nolan and Burnham. Be-
cause the right has First Amendment status, it prevails over all but
82. 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972).
83. The active/passive distinction relates only to the manner in which communica-
tion is initiated. Thereafter, the purpose of both rights is to protect the same flow
of information from news source to listener. See note 66 supra.
84. 451 F.2d 545, 546 (Ist Cir. 1971); 342 F. Supp. 880, 882-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
85. Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972) at 1, 1 Psso. L. Rpm 141 (1972).
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compelling state interests just as did the amalgam of rights cited in
those cases.80 To the extent that a prison could legitimately insist that
the number of letters or interviews be restricted, the prisoner himself,
by allocating his quota of letters or interview requests to those he pre-
fers, would determine whose right to hear would be vindicated.
Similarly, the right to gather news as it emerges from Branzburg
would still justify the outcome in Washington Post. Since the restric-
tion on news gathering there was direct, unlike the indirect effect
alleged in Branzburg,7 proof of a causal link between the state prac-
tice and the resulting "inhibition" on the flow of news would be irrele-
vant.8 Even though it is reduced to individual status, the news-gather-
ing right is still entitled to First Amendment protection 9 and would
thus again prevail absent state interests more significant than those in
Washington Post. Restrictions on the number of interviews might, of
course, be necessary if more reporters sought interviews than could be
accommodated,90 but here again there is little need for a judicial allo-
cation of access opportunities. The prisoner himself has a privacy right
not to be interviewed 0' and can thus exclude interviewers, largely elimi.
nating the need for any judicial intervention.
In fact, the second Washington Post opinion," rendered after a re-
mand for reconsideration in the light of Branzburg,0 4 based its holding
86. In Nolan, the result of using the individual right to hear doctrine might have
been even more favorable to prisoners and press listeners. While the "public right to
hear" doctrine protected only inmate correspondence relating to prison affairs, 451
F.2d at 546, the individual right to hear protects all communication directed to a
listener, regardless of its content. See note 20 supra.
87. See p. 1346 supra.
88. Despite this crucial distinction, the second Washington Post opinion apparently
felt obliged to demonstrate that the Branzburg standard of proof on the probability of
news flow diminishment had been met by finding that "the sources of news are
solely in the prisons. No alternative satisfactory sources arc available and the press
claims its proper right of access." Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Dec. 19, 1972) at 6.
89. Branzburg's specific recognition of the existence of a First Amendment right to
gather news, 408 U.S. at 681, may cast doubt on the continuing validity of the Court's
refusal in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), to accord First Amendment protection
to information acquisition. The cases are distinguishable, though, in that Zemnel In.
volved a restriction on travel to a foreign country. Id. at 15-16.
The issue of Zeme's continuing validity aside, Branzburg, at the very least, requires
some protection for news gathering. While the degree of protection allowed is not
clear, the opinion suggests that direct restrictions on news gathering are to be tested
against traditional First Amendment standards. 408 U.S. at 700-01. Indirect restrictions,
however, are subject only to an ambiguous "constriction in flow of news" test-unique In
recent First Amendment decisions. See note 64 supra.
90. See, e.g., Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
91. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5,
1972) at 3, 1 PISON L. Rm. 141 (1972).
92. If an inmate indicated he was willing to be interviewed by any newsman but
had no basis for choosing among them, a court might resolve access problems by ap.
plication of a "neutral" access-rationing scheme, such as "first come, first served" or
random selection.
93. Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Dec. 19, 1972).
94. Civil No. 72-1362 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1972), 1 PIsoN L. Rpm. 337 (1972).
1352
Vol. 82: 1'337, 1973
Public and Preis Rights of Access to Prisoners
on an individual news-gathering right. Shifting conceptual grounds,
the court reaffirmed its disapproval of the interview ban, not on the
theory that special reporters' rights were at stake, but rather because
members of the public had a right of access which protected reporters
as much as anyone else.95 Such emphasis on the individual's right to
receive information scarcely constitutes new First Amendment theory. 0
Indeed, if the Amendment protects the communication of propaganda
from foreign communists97 or salacious books from foreign publish-
ers, 98 surely it should operate with at least equal vigor to protect com-
munication between American prisoners and thd public. The prison
cases thus correct a long period of judicial oversight 9 by effectively
extending the right to hear to the prison context, not just for reporters
but for every individual. A second and perhaps less commendable result
of application of the individual right to hear to the prison context is
to render the constitutional status of prisoner expression irrelevant,
since the right to hear, standing alone, mandates the full application
of First Amendment standards.
Thus, while vindication of the individual right to hear is undoubt-
edly a practical success for those asserting prisoner access rights,100 it
leaves unresolved the question of what First Amendment rights prison-
ers themselves ought to enjoy.' 0 ' But if prisoners were generally ac-
corded the First Amendment rights of ordinary citizens, there would be
no need for right to hear doctrines, since prisoners' rights would always
be sufficient to invoke the First Amendment. This would not, how-
ever, mean that all speech activities would be protected inside a prison:
Expression could still be legitimately curtailed where necessary to fur-
ther the special state interests involved in corrections, so long as no less
drastic means were available.
102
95. Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Dec. 19, 1972) at 5.6.
96. See p. 1345 supra.
97. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
98. United States v. Eighteen Packages of Magazines, 238 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 194).
99. See note 18 supra.
100. See p. 1342 supra.
101. Nolan, Washington Post, and Burnham, for example, cannot een support the
proposition that prisoners themselves enjoy a right of access to newsmen which inde-
pendently merits First Amendment protection since in each decision the constitutional
protection of communication between newsmen and inmates was based on the ag-
gregate effect of an amalgam of prisoners' and non-prisoners' rights. See p. 1342 supra.
102. The outcome of the less drastic means test in the prison context might well differ
in many instances from the result in the "outside" world since peculiar state interests, such
as security and rehabilitation, are at stake. For example, prison administrators have
an obvious interest in preventing the use of the mails to transmit escape plans. In-
spection and interception of incoming and outgoing mail containing such plans may
well be the least drastic means by which that state interest can be adequately furthered.
Such screening would probably thus meet First Amendment standards, though it would
certainly be unconstitutional if applied outside the prison where no special security
interests are at stake. See generally Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amend-
ment, 81 YAm L.J. 87, 94-104 (1971).
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Conclusion
The task of extending full expression rights to inmates belongs to
future courts. Nolan, Washington Post and Burnham, unwilling to
break with the notion that prisoners do not enjoy the full protection of
the Constitution, 03 compromised by extending protection on the basis
of a combination of prisoner and non-prisoner rights. Though achiev-
ing results of practical benefit to prisoners and public alike, the deci-
sions fail to take the final steps in the journey toward full recognition
of prisoners' First Amendment rights begun by Cooper v. Pate'0 4 in
1964.
103. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547 (Ist Cir. 1971); Washington Post Co. v.
Kleindienst, Civil No. 467-72 (D.D.C., Apr. 5, 1972) at 3, 1 PnisoN L. Ri'm. 141 (1972);
Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
104. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
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